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ABSTRACT
A preferential domain is a collection of sets of preferences which
are linear orders over a set of alternatives. These domains have been
studied extensively in social choice theory due to both its practical
importance and theoretical elegance. Examples of some extensively
studied preferential domains include single peaked, single crossing,
Euclidean, etc. In this paper, we study the sample complexity of
testing whether a given preference profile is close to some specific
domain. We consider two notions of closeness: (a) closeness via
preferences, and (b) closeness via alternatives. We further explore
the effect of assuming that the outlier preferences/alternatives to be
random (instead of arbitrary) on the sample complexity of the test-
ing problem. In most cases, we show that the above testing problem
can be solved with high probability for all commonly used domains
by observing only a small number of samples (independent of the
number of preferences, n, and often the number of alternatives,m).
In the remaining few cases, we prove either impossibility results
or Ω(n) lower bound on the sample complexity. We complement
our theoretical findings with extensive simulations to figure out
the actual constant factors of our asymptotic sample complexity
bounds.
KEYWORDS
Computational social choice; preferential domain; sampling; algo-
rithms
1 INTRODUCTION
Learning users’ preferences is useful in the contexts of social choice,
recommender systems, product development, and many more appli-
cations. It is often observed that preferences are never completely
arbitrary, rather they possess correlated structures [23]. For ex-
ample, preferences of citizens for a facility location have a single
peaked structure [21, Section 1], i.e., a citizen has highest preference
for the facility at her location and it monotonically decreases with
the distance from her. This kind of preferences are also prevalent in
political opinions based on the voters’ bias to the conservative or
liberal views [27]. Intuitively, in a single peaked preference profile,
we assume that there exists a societal axis where the alternatives
have been ordered and every preference “respects” that ordering in
the following sense. Every preference has an implicit most preferred
point t on the societal axis and if an alternative x lies between t and
another alternative y, then x is preferred over y. The advantage of
Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2019), N. Agmon, M. E. Taylor, E. Elkind, M. Veloso (eds.), May 2019, Montreal,
Canada
© 2019 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
https://doi.org/doi
preferences with such structures is that they can efficiently bypass
the classic impossibility results of social choice theory [2, 24, 38].
Similarly, in the design of recommender systems, it has often
been observed that users’ preferences (and hence their recommenda-
tions) have patterns that are (a) demography-based, (b) knowledge-
based, (c) feature-based, or (d) content based [35]. While designing
a product, an enterprise may wish to look for structures in the end
users’ preferences, and design their product such that a collectively
‘efficient’ choice is made to cater a large number of users.
While it is difficult to predict the users’ preferences apriori, data
on the preferences, obtained through users’ purchase and browsing
patterns, or through surveys, are plentiful which are classified into
demography, knowledge, affinity towards a feature or content. It
remains to discover whether the preferences come from a specific
class that we call preferential domains or simply, domains.
A domain is a collection of sets of preferences over a set of
alternatives. A preference profile, i.e., the tuple of preferences of all
the agents/users, is said to belong to a domain if, for some set in
the domain, every preference in the profile belongs to that set.
Example 1.1 (Single peaked domain). Consider three alternatives
a,b, c . The single peaked domain with these alternatives is denoted
by D = {B1, . . . ,B6}, where B1 = {(abc), (bac), (bca), (cba)}
when the societal order over the alternatives is a ≺ b ≺ c , and
similarly, B2, . . . ,B6 are the sets of preferences over the same al-
ternatives for different societal orders of a,b, and c .
Some prominent examples of domains are single peaked, single
crossing, Euclidean, [23] etc. The benefit of the discovery of such
domains (even as a partial population) is that a much refined plan
or protocol can be designed for such domains which satisfy sev-
eral desirable axioms. For example, the median voting rule in the
single peaked domain ensures that no voter can gain by misreport-
ing her preference [34]. Another reason to study various domains
concerns computational considerations. Indeed, some of the most
fundamental problems in computational social choice, for example,
computing winners for many important voting rules such as Ke-
meny, Dodgson, and Young are computationally intractable [8]. It
turns out that most of these problems become efficiently solvable
in many domains, single peaked for example [7].
Our work in this paper contributes to uncovering whether a
given preference profile is “close” to some domain, through sam-
pling a small number of preferences and/or alternatives. The guar-
antees we provide are probabilistic that converges to unity as more
preferences/alternatives are investigated – the cost of such an in-
vestigation is often proportional to the number of samples drawn,
known as sample complexity. Hence our goal is to minimize the
sample complexity of our algorithms. For example, our algorithms
could be used to predict whether there exist at least, say 95%, of
the preferences in a profile which are single peaked. If we know
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Input profile
Sample complexity
Possibility 1 Possibility 2
εvn random preferences away
random
O( 1(1−εv )2 log
1
δ ) [Theorem 3.1]
εvn arbitrary preferences away O( 1(1−3εv )2 ln
1
δ ) for εv < 1/3⋆ [Theorem 3.4]
εam alternatives away O(log log1/εa 1/δδ log1/εa 1δ log log1/εa 1/δ ) [Theorem 3.10]
εvn arbitrary preferences away
ε ′vn arbitrary
preferences away
O( 1(ε ′v−εv )2 (2
mm2 log2m + log 1/δ )) [Corollary 3.9]
εam alternatives away ε ′am alternatives away
Ω(n log 1/δ ) even for εa = 0 and
for every 0 < ε ′a ⩽ 1 and 0 < δ < 1/2 [Theorem 3.13]
Table 1: Summary of results for distinguishing profiles in the first column from the profiles in the second column; all the
distances are from the single peaked domain. ⋆ : For any 0 ⩽ εv < 1, we refer to Theorem 3.6. Refer to Section 2.2 for our
sampling model.
the societal order of the single peaked preferences (which consti-
tute at least 95% of the profile), using median voting rule on the
single peaked sub-profile would yield all the desirable properties
of the median voting rule, e.g., truthfulness for those 95% of the
population. These kind of truthfulness of a fraction of voters is
referred to as “approximate truthfulness.” In many applications like
public good provisioning, it is highly beneficial to uncover truthful
opinions from the vast majority of the population.
To put our work in perspective, we revisit a question that is often
asked in computational social choice for any domain. This is about
the existence of an efficient recognition algorithm: given a profile P,
does there exist a polynomial time algorithm to decide whether P
belongs to the domain? There exist efficient recognition algorithms
for many popular domains, for example, single peaked [6], single
crossing [14], etc. [15, 16, 28, 32]. One notable exception is the
Euclidean domain of dimension two where the recognition problem
is NP-hard [36].
There are two main limitations of the recognition problem. First,
the problem formulation is “exact.” Real world profiles are almost
never perfect and thus they can only be at most “close” to some
domain. More specifically, there may be few preferences or alter-
natives (treated as outliers) whom we need to ignore to obtain
the required structure. Unfortunately, outliers’ consideration often
makes the related recognition problem intractable, (e.g., the voter
deletion for single peaked domain [19]). Second, the recognition
problem needs access to the entire preference profile. In many sit-
uations, e.g., pre-election polls, surveys, etc., we only have access
to samples. In other cases, the number of preferences may be too
large and, depending on the application at hand, a sub-linear time
(possibly approximation) algorithm may be more useful. We ad-
dress both these issues by defining a related testing problem. As a
concrete use case, a social planner could use our testing algorithms
to know whether it is possible to remove, say 5% of the preferences
to obtain a single peaked structure by observing a small number of
samples.
A corresponding computational problem is: can a profile of n
preferences over m alternatives belong to some domain D after
deleting, say at most k preferences (or alternatives), by drawing a
small number of samples? However, any algorithm for this problem
would need to observe Ω(n) samples which defeats the main pur-
pose of testing (except when D is empty or D contains all possible
profiles). To see this, let us consider a specific case ofD to be single
peaked; the set of alternatives be {a,b, c}. Let P be a profile con-
sisting of n/2 (say n is an even integer) copies of a ≻ b ≻ c , (n/2) − 1
copies of a ≻ c ≻ b, and one c ≻ b ≻ a. We observe that P is not
single peaked after observing the last preference c ≻ b ≻ a. How-
ever, deletion of that preference makes it single peaked. Let us now
consider another profile Q consisting of n/2 copies of a ≻ b ≻ c ,
(n/2) − 2 copies of a ≻ c ≻ b, and two copies of c ≻ b ≻ a. Again,
Q is not single peaked, but deletion of the two copies of c ≻ b ≻ a
makes it single peaked.We now observe that the KL-divergence [29]
between the two distributions of samples for P and Q is O(1/n) and
thus distinguishing P from Q (which any testing algorithm has to
do) requires Ω(n) samples to succeed with any constant nonzero
probability [4]. To overcome this lower bound, we introduce (as is
ubiquitous in testing literature [25, 37]) a “gap” in the two possible
inputs. In all our testing problems, we are given a profile as input
which is guaranteed to be one of the two possible types, and we
need to find which one it is. The two possibilities for the input will
cover all the cases except few and thus there is a “gap.”
1.1 Our Contribution
Our specific contribution in this paper are as follows. The error
probability of any algorithm below is at most δ ∈ (0, 1).
(i) We present a sampling based algorithm to distinguish any
profile for which there exists a set R of at most εvn preferences
(or εam alternatives) whose deletion makes the resulting profile
belong to D from any random profile (refer to the first three rows
in Table 1). We observe that the sample complexity depends on
whether we assume R to be arbitrary or random. We remark that,
in the testing literature [1, 26, 39], it is popular to assume the noise
to be random which is equivalent to assuming the preferences in
R to be random in our context.
(ii) For any 0 ⩽ εv < ε ′v ⩽ 1, we present a sampling based algo-
rithm to distinguish any profile for which there exist at most εvn
preferences whose deletion makes the resulting profile belong to
D from any profile where one has to delete at least ε ′vn preferences
to make it belong to D (refer to the fourth row in Table 1).
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(iii) In the case of alternatives, we prove that any algorithm for
distinguishing any profile for which there exist at most εam alter-
natives whose deletion makes the resulting profile belong to D
from any profile where one has to delete at least ε ′am alternatives
to make it belong to D has sample complexity of Ω(n log 1/δ ) for
every 0 ⩽ εa < ε ′a ⩽ 1 even when εa = 0 (refer to the fifth row
in Table 1). This shows that detecting arbitrary outlier alternatives
is much harder than detecting arbitrary outlier preferences from a
sample complexity viewpoint.
We remark that all our results in Table 1 for the single peaked
domain actually extend to any domain as described in Section 3.
From a technical point of view, to tackle preferences which are
outliers, we define and exploit a notion called content of a domain
which, informally, is the maximum number of distinct preferences
that any profile in the domain can contain as a function of the
number of alternatives. On the other hand, we blendwith it the ideas
from the classical coupon collector problem to handle alternatives
which are outliers. To develop an algorithm for the case when
the outliers can be arbitrary, we prove a key structural result (in
Lemma 3.7) for arbitrary domain which may be of independent
interest also.
1.2 Related Work
The computational problem of recognizing whether a given pro-
file belongs to a domain has been studied extensively in computa-
tional social choice. Trick [6] shows that the recognition problem
is polynomial time solvable for single peaked profiles. Escoffier
et al. [20] improve the efficiency of the recognition algorithm
for the single peaked profiles. Elkind et al. [18] present a poly-
nomial time algorithm for recognizing single crossing profiles. Bar-
berà and Moreno [5] discover a property called top monotonicity
which simultaneously generalizes both single peakedness and sin-
gle crossingness. Magiera and Faliszewski [32] present polynomial
time recognition algorithm for top monotonic profiles. Doignon
and Falmagne [14] show that the recognition problem for the
one dimensional Euclidean domain is polynomial time solvable.
Knoblauch [28] and Elkind and Faliszewski [15] present alternative
algorithms for recognizing one dimensional Euclidean profiles. Pe-
ters [36] shows that recognizing Euclidean profiles of dimension at
least two is NP-hard.
Lackner [30] shows that the computational problem of finding if
it is possible to extend a given incomplete profile to a single peaked
profile is NP-complete. However, if we restrict ourselves to only
weak orders, then the computational problem of recognizing incom-
plete single peaked profiles is polynomial time solvable [22]. The
above problem is polynomial time solvable for single crossing pro-
files too [16]. Erdélyi [19] studies complexity of the computational
problem of deciding whether a given profile can be “made” single
peaked by deleting few preferences or alternatives; Bredereck et
al. [10] study complexity of this problem for single peaked, single-
caved, single-crossing, etc. profiles. Ballester and Haeringer [3]
present characterization of single peaked profiles through succinct
forbidden configurations. Bredereck et al. [9] show forbidden con-
figurations for the single crossing profiles. Elkind et al. [17] present
forbidden configurations for profiles which are simultaneously sin-
gle peaked and single crossing. A related literature studies the
likelihood of a random profile being single peaked [11, 12, 31].
2 PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
For any two positive integers k and ℓ with k ⩽ ℓ, we denote the
set {j ∈ N : 1 ⩽ j ⩽ k} by [k] and the set {j ∈ N : k ⩽ j ⩽ ℓ} by
[k, ℓ]. For a set X, we denote its power set by 2X . Let A be a finite
set of alternatives of cardinalitym. Preferences are linear orders
overA. We denote the set of all linear orders overA by L(A). For
any positive integer n, a tuple (≻i )i ∈[n] of n preferences is called a
profile. If not mentioned otherwise, we usem,n, and A to denote
the number of alternatives, the number of preferences in a profile,
and the set of alternatives, respectively. For a subset X ⊆ A and a
preference ≻ ∈ L(A), we denote the restriction of ≻ toX by ≻ (X).
A preferential domain or simply domain is a collection of subsets
of ∪ |A |>0L(A). We call a domain D nontrivial if D , ∅ and
D , ∪ |A |>02L(A). Given a domainD and a profile P = (≻i )i ∈[n]
over A, we say (with slight abuse of notation) that P ∈ D if
there exists a B ∈ D such that P ∈ Bn . We call a domain D
neutral if whenever (≻i )i ∈[n] ∈ D, we have (σ (≻i ))i ∈[n] ∈ D
for every permutation σ of [m]; if ≻i is defined as a1 ≻ a2 ≻
· · · ≻ am , then σ (≻i ) is defined as aσ (1) ≻ aσ (2) ≻ · · · ≻ aσ (m).
We call a domain D normal if whenever (≻i )i ∈[n] ∈ D, we have
(≻i (X))i ∈[n] ∈ D for every X ⊆ A. In this work, we consider
only neutral and normal domains. We remark that many popular
domains including single peaked, single caved, single crossing, top
restricted, bottom restricted, etc. satisfy these two properties (the
only notable exception is the domain of top monotonic [5] profiles).
Let D be any domain and P = (≻i )i ∈[n] ∈ L(A)n be a profile.
If it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) there exists a subset J ⊂ [n] such that |J | = ℓ and (≻i )i ∈J ∈
D, and
(ii) for every subsetK ⊂ [n] such that |K | > ℓ, we have (≻i )i ∈K <
D,
then we say that the preference-distance of P from D is (n − ℓ),
and we call the preferences which need to be deleted to bring the
profile back to D to be preference outliers. Similarly, we can define
the notion of alternative-distance (where only alternatives need to
be deleted) and alternative outliers.
Our first problem is to distinguish a profile which is, informally
speaking, εam alternatives and random εvn preferences away from
some domain D vs a random profile. We call this problem (εv , εa ,
δ , D) – Random Outliers vs Random Profile Test which is
formally defined as follows.
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Problem1 ((εv , εa , δ ,D) – RandomOutliers vs Random Profile
Test). Let (≻i )i ∈[n] be a profile over a setA of alternatives which is
either one of the following kind:
(i) There existsW ⊆ [n] and X ⊆ A with |W| ⩾ (1 − εv )n and
|X| ⩾ (1 − εa )m such that the profile (≻i (X))i ∈W belongs to
the domainD and ≻j (X) is distributed uniformly in L(X) for
every j ∈ [n] \W.
(ii) The preference ≻i is distributed uniformly randomly in L(A)
for every i ∈ [n].
Output 1 if the input profile is of the first kind and 0 if it is of the
second kind; the probability of error can be at most δ .
Problem 1 assumes that the preference outliers are distributed
uniformly randomly which can be a strong assumption depending
on the application at hand. The (εv , εa , δ , D) – Arbitrary Out-
liers vs Random Profile Test problem in Problem 2 removes this
assumption.
Problem 2 ((εv , εa , δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs Random
Profile Test). Let (≻i )i ∈[n] be a profile over a setA of alternatives
which is either one of the following:
(i) There existsW ⊆ [n] and X ⊆ A with |W| ⩾ (1 − εv )n and
|X| ⩾ (1 − εa )m such that the profile (≻i (X))i ∈W belongs to
the domain D.
(ii) The preference ≻i is distributed uniformly randomly in L(A)
for every i ∈ [n].
Output 1 if the input profile is of the first kind and 0 if it is of the
second kind; the probability of error can be at most δ .
Problem 2 still retains the assumption from Problem 1 that the
second possibility for the input profile is random. The (εv , εa , ε ′v ,
ε ′a , δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs Arbitrary Profile Test
problem in Problem 3 is the most general problem in our paper
which removes all these structural assumptions from Problems 1
and 2.
Problem 3 ((εv , εa , ε ′v , ε ′a , δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs
Arbitrary Profile Test). Let (≻i )i ∈[n] be a profile over a set
A of alternatives which is either one of the following kind where
0 ⩽ εv < ε ′v ⩽ 1 and 0 ⩽ εa < ε ′a ⩽ 1:
(i) There existsW ⊆ [n] and X ⊆ A with |W| ⩾ (1 − εv )n and
|X| ⩾ (1 − εa )m such that the profile (≻i (X))i ∈W belongs to
the domain D.
(ii) For every W ⊆ [n] and X ⊆ A with |W| > (1 − ε ′v )n and
|X| > (1 − ε ′a )m, the profile (≻i (X))i ∈W does not belong to
the domain D.
Output 1 if the input profile is of the first kind and 0 if it is of the
second kind; the probability of error can be at most δ .
In Problems 1 to 3, the error probability is taken over the random-
ness used in generating the instances in (ii) and the randomness
used by the algorithm.
2.1 Content and Residue of Domain
We now define the content and residue of any domain which will
make the many of our results simpler to state. LetD be any domain.
We define the content of D as a function conD : N −→ [0, 1]
such that any profile with m ∈ N alternatives in D can have at
most conD (m)m! distinct preferences; we call the function resD :
N −→ [0, 1] defined as resD (m) = 1 − conD (m) the residue of a
domain. For example, consingle peaked(2) = 1, consingle peaked(3) =
2/3, consingle crossing(m) = ((m2 )+1)/m! [13]. For technical reason, let
us assume that conD (1) = 1 for every D. We observe that, for
normal domains, the function conD (·) is non-increasing (and thus
resD (·) is a non-decreasing function). Whenever the domain D is
immediate from the context, we omit D from subscript of con and
res.
2.2 Sampling Model and Sample Complexity
In our model, there is an oracle which, when queried, returns an
agent v picked uniformly randomly with replacement from the set
of all agents. Now the algorithm can ask the agent v an arbitrary
number of comparison queries – in a comparison query, two alter-
natives x andy are presented to the agentv and it replies whether it
prefers x over y or y over x . The sample complexity of an algorithm
is defined to be the total number of comparison queries it makes
during its execution. We remark that defining sample complexity
(instead of the number of agents sampled) as the number of com-
parison queries enables us to perform more fine grained analysis
of the complexity of our problems.
2.3 Chernoff Bound
We repeatedly use the following concentration inequality:
Theorem 2.1. Let X1, . . . ,Xℓ be a sequence of ℓ independent ran-
dom variables in [0, 1] (not necessarily identical). Let S = ∑i Xi and
let µ = E [S]. Then, for any 0 ⩽ δ ⩽ 1:
Pr[|S − µ | ⩾ δℓ] < 2 exp(−2ℓδ2), (1)
and
Pr[|S − µ | ⩾ δµ] < 2 exp(−δ2µ/3). (2)
Equations (1) and (2) are called additive and multiplicative versions
of the bound respectively.
3 RESULTS
We now present our main results. Our general approach would be
to explain our algorithms for the special case of the single peaked
domain first and then generalize to arbitrary domain; we make an
exception for few cases where presenting the general case directly
better reveals the key idea. In the interest of space, we omit some
of our proofs, which can be found in the supplemental material.
For ease of exposition and interest of space, we have deferred our
more involved algorithms for the cases when both preferences and
alternatives could simultaneously be outliers to the supplemental
material.
3.1 Only Preferences as Outliers
In this subsection, we focus on the case when only preferences are
considered as outliers. We begin with presenting our (εv , 0, δ , D)
– Random Outliers vs Random Profile Tester for the single
peaked domain. Our algorithm first fixes any three alternatives, say
a,b, and c . Then it samples few preferences restricted to these three
alternatives only. If all the six possible permutations of a,b, and c
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appear nearly same number of times, then the algorithm predicts
the profile to be a random profile; otherwise it predicts it to be
close to single peaked. We now formally present our algorithm in
Theorem 3.1.
Algorithm 1 (εv , 0, δ , single peak) – Random Outliers vs Ran-
dom Profile Tester
Input: Oracle access to a profile P
Output: 1 if there exists εvn preferences whose deletion makes the
resulting profile single peaked and 0 if P has been generated
randomly
1: Let a,b, c ∈ A be any 3 arbitrary alternatives
2: Sample ℓ = 72(1−εv )2 ln
6
δ preferences restricted to {a,b, c} uni-
formly at random from the input profile with replacement. Let
B ∈ L({a,b, c})ℓ be the profile of sampled preferences
3: Let t be the minimum number of times any preference in
L({a,b, c}) appear in B
4: if t < ℓ12 (1 + εv ) then
5: return 1
6: else
7: return 0
8: end if
Theorem 3.1. For at least 3 alternatives, there exists a (εv , 0,
δ , single peak) – Random Outliers vs Random Profile Tester
with sample complexity O( 1(1−εv )2 log
1
δ ) for every 0 ⩽ εv < 1 and
0 < δ < 1/2. If there are only 2 alternatives, then there does not exist
any such tester.
Proof. Form = 2, the result follows from the observation that a
profile where every preference is distributed uniformly in the set of
all possible preferences is single peaked and thus the two cases are
statistically indistinguishable. So let us assumem ⩾ 3 and a,b, and
c be any three alternatives. We pick ℓ = 72(1−εv )2 ln
6
δ preferences
uniformly at random with replacement and query oracle to know
how a,b, and c are ordered in these preferences. Let pi , i ∈ [6], be
all possible permutations of {a,b, c} and Xi be the random variable
denoting the number of sampled preferences where the permutation
pi appears for i ∈ [6]. We output 1 if mini ∈[6] Xi < ℓ12 (1 + εv ) and
output 0 otherwise. We observe that the sample complexity of our
algorithm is 6ℓ = O( 1(1−εv )2 ln
1
δ ). We now turn to the correctness
of our algorithm. For that we show that irrespective of the input
profile, the probability of making an error is at most δ .
▷Case I - the input profile is single peaked after deleting at
most εvn preferences which are distributed uniformly: Let P
be the input profile and Q be a sub-profile of P which is single
peaked and contains at least (1 − εv )n preferences. Hence, there
exists an η ∈ [6] such that the preference pη does not appear in
Q. Since the preferences in P \ Q is uniformly distributed and
|P \ Q| ⩽ εvn/6, we have E[Xη ] ⩽ εv ℓ/6. Using Chernoff bound
(additive form), we now have the following:
Pr[error] ⩽ Pr[X j ⩾ ℓ12 (1 + εv )] ⩽ exp{− ℓ(1−εv )
2
72 } ⩽ δ
▷Case II - the input profile is distributed uniformly: Since
every preference in profile P is uniformly distributed, for every
i ∈ [6], we have E[Xi ] = ℓ/6. Using Chernoff bound (multiplicative
form) followed by union bound, we have the following:
Pr[error] = Pr[∃i ∈ [6],Xi ⩽ ℓ12 (1 + εv )]
⩽ 6 exp{−(1−εv )2ℓ/48} ⩽ δ □
The main idea in Theorem 3.1 can be easily extended to arbitrary
domains.
Corollary 3.2. Let D be any normal and neutral domain and
m0 = min{m : conD (m) < 1}. For at least m0 alternatives, there
exists a (εv , 0, δ , D) – Random Outliers vs Random Profile
Testerwith sample complexityO( 1(1−εv )2 ln
1
δ ) for every 0 ⩽ εv < 1
and 0 < δ < 1/2. If the number of alternatives is at mostm0 − 1, then
there does not exist any such tester.
We now turn our attention to the (εv , 0, δ , D) – Arbitrary
Outliers vs Random Profile Test problem; that is when the
outliers can be arbitrary (need not be randomly generated). We
begin with presenting a general impossibility result in this case.
Its proof follows from the observation that, in this case, one can
carefully construct the set of outliers so that the distribution of
samples in both the possibilities are statistically indistinguishable.
Proposition 3.3. For every domain D, there does not exist any
(εv , 0, δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs Random Profile Tester
for any εv ⩾ resD (m) wherem is the number of alternatives in the
input profile.
We now present our (εv , 0, δ , single peak) – Arbitrary Out-
liers vs Random Profile Tester for εv < 1/3 in Theorem 3.4. We
defer our general (εv , 0, δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs Random
Profile Tester till Theorem 3.6 which not only handles every
εv < 1 but also takes care of arbitrary domain (but the sample
complexity will be worse than that of Theorem 3.4). The main idea
of the algorithm in Theorem 3.4 is exactly the same as the algorithm
in Theorem 3.1 – it samples some preferences restricted to any 3
alternatives and outputs that the profile is random if all the 6 possi-
ble permutations appear nearly equal number of times; otherwise
it says that the profile is close to single peaked.
Theorem 3.4. There exists a (εv , 0, δ , single peak) – Arbitrary
Outliers vs Random Profile Tester with sample complexity
O( 1(1−3εv )2 ln
1
δ ) for every 0 ⩽ εv < 1/3.
Proof. As in Theorem 3.1, we choose any 3 alternatives a,b,
and c , pick ℓ = 72(1−3εv )2 ln
6
δ preferences uniformly at random with
replacement, and query oracle to know how a,b, and c are ordered
in these preferences. We output 1 if mini ∈[6] Xi < ℓ12 (1 + 3εv )
and output 0 otherwise (with notation as defined in the proof of
Theorem 3.1). The proof of correctness and the analysis of the
sample complexity of our algorithm is similar to Theorem 3.1 using
the observation that, when the input profile can be made single
peaked by deleting at most εvn preferences, there exists an η ∈ [6]
such that Xη ⩽ εv ℓ/2 since ressingle peak(3) = 1/3. □
From the proof of Theorem 3.4, the following generalization to
arbitrary domain is immediate.
Corollary 3.5. Letm0 = min{m ∈ N : resD (m) < 1} and the
number of alternatives is at leastm0. Then there exists a (εv , 0, δ , D)
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– Arbitrary Outliers vs Random Profile Tester with sample
complexity O( 1(1−(εv/resD(m0)))2 ln
1
δ ) for every εv with 0 ⩽ εv <
resD (m0) (the O notation in the sample complexity hides constant
which depends onm0).
We now present our (εv , 0, δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs
Random Profile Tester for any εv < 1 generalizing Theorem 3.4.
Of course we need the number of alternatives to be at leastm(εv )
wherem(εv ) = min{m ∈ N : resD (m) > εv } due to Proposition 3.3.
Theorem 3.6. Given a domain D, any εv with 0 ⩽ εv < 1
with resD (m) > εv , there exists a (εv , 0, δ , D) – Arbitrary
Outliers vs Random Profile Tester with sample complexity
O(m(εv )!m(εv )2 log2m(εv )(1−(εv/resD(m(εv ))))2 ln
1
δ ) where m(εv ) = min{ℓ ∈ N :
resD (ℓ) > εv }.
Proof. Let A ′ ⊆ A be any subset of alternatives with |A ′ | =
m(εv ). We pick ℓ = 16m(εv )!m(εv ) logm(εv )(1−(εv/resD(m(εv ))))2 ln
1
δ preferences uni-
formly at random and elicit these preferences restricted to A ′. For
≻ ∈ L(A ′), let X≻ be the random variable denoting the num-
ber of sampled preferences which are the same as ≻. We out-
put 1 if min≻∈L(A′) X≻ < ℓ2m(εv )! (1 + (εv/resD (m(εv )))) and out-
put 0 otherwise. The sample complexity complexity of the algo-
rithm is O(m(εv )!m(εv )2 log2m(εv )(1−(εv/resD(m(εv ))))2 ln
1
δ ). The proof of correctness
of our algorithm is similar to that of Theorem 3.1 using the ob-
servation that, when the input profile can be made single peaked
by deleting at most εvn preferences, there exists an ≻ ∈ L(A ′)
such that X≻ ⩽ εv ℓresD (m(εv ))m(εv )! (follows from the definition of
resD (m(εv ))). □
We now present our result for the (εv , 0, ε ′v , 0, δ ,D) –Arbitrary
Outliers vs Arbitrary Profile Test problem. The following
structural result provides the key building block of our algorithm.
Intuitively the lemma proves that, given a profile P, if we sample
preferences from P uniformly at random with replacement to con-
struct another profile Q (of certain size), then the “relative” distance
of Q from any domain D is approximately same as the relative
distance of P from D.
Lemma 3.7. Let D be any normal and neutral domain and (≻i
)i ∈[n] ∈ L(A)n be a profile with preference-distance being εvn from
D. Let 0 < ∆ < min{εv , 1−εv }, ℓ = 4∆2 (conD (m)m!m lnm+ ln 1/δ ),
and ≻′= (≻′i )i ∈[ℓ] be a profile where ≻′i has been picked uniformly
at random with replacement from the n preferences of ≻. Then the
preference-distance of ≻′ from D is at least (εv − ∆)ℓ and at most
(εv + ∆)ℓ with probability at least 1 − δ for every 0 < δ < 1.
We now present our (εv , 0, ε ′v , 0, δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers
vs Arbitrary Profile Tester. The high level idea is to sample
some number ℓ of preferences, compute the distance ε ′′ℓ of the
resulting profile from the single peaked domain, and output the
distance of the original profile to be εn if and only if ε ′′ is closer to
ε than ε ′.
Theorem 3.8. For every domain D, there exists a (εv , 0, ε ′v , 0, δ ,
D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs Arbitrary Profile Tester with
sample complexity O( 1(ε ′v−εv )2 (conD (m)m!m
2 log2m + log 1/δ )) for
every 0 ⩽ εv < ε ′v < 1 and 0 < δ < 1/2.
Algorithm 2 (εv , 0, ε ′v , 0, δ , single peak) – Arbitrary Outliers
vs Arbitrary Profile Tester
Input: Oracle access to a profile P
Output: 1 if there exists εvn preferences whose deletion makes
the resulting profile single peaked and 0 if deleting any ε ′vn
preferences from P does not make the resulting profile single
peaked
1: Sample ℓ = 64(ε ′v−εv )2 (2
mm lnm + ln 1/δ ) preferences uniformly
at random from the input profile with replacement. Let B ∈
L(A)ℓ be the profile of sampled preferences
2: Let t be the minimum number of times any preference in
L({a,b, c}) appear in B
3: if B can be made single peaked by deleting at most (εv+ε ′v )ℓ/2
preferences then
4: return 1
5: else
6: return 0
7: end if
We observe that consingle peaked(m) = 2m−1/m! [20, Lemma 2]
and consingle crossing(m) = ((m2 )+1)/m!. Hence, from Theorem 3.8, we
obtain the following result for the single peaked and single crossing
domains.
Corollary 3.9. There exists a (εv , 0, ε ′v , 0, δ , D) – Arbitrary
Outliers vs Arbitrary Profile Tester with sample complexity
O( 1(ε ′v−εv )2 (2
mm2 log2m + log 1/δ )) for the single peaked domain
and with sample complexity O( 1(ε ′v−εv )2 (m
4 log2m+ log 1/δ )) for the
single crossing domain for every 0 ⩽ εv < ε ′v < 1 and 0 < δ < 1/2.
3.2 Only Alternatives as Outliers
In this subsection, we now focus on the case when only alternatives
are considered as outliers. We observe that when only alternatives
act as outliers, the (0, εa , δ , D) – Random Outliers vs Random
Profile Test and (0, εa , δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs Random
Profile Test are the same problem. We begin with presenting our
(0, εa , δ , single peak) – Random Outliers vs Random Profile
Tester in Theorem 3.10 below. On a high level, our algorithm in
Theorem 3.10 samples some number t of preferences restricted to
some number ℓ of alternatives. If for every 3 alternatives among
those ℓ alternatives, all the 6 possible permutations appear in the
sampled preferences, then the algorithm outputs the profile to be
random, otherwise it says that the profile is close to being single
peaked.
Theorem 3.10. There exists a (0, εa , δ , single peak) – Random
Outliers vs Random Profile Tester with sample complexity
O(log log1/εa 1/δδ log1/εa 1δ log log1/εa 1/δ ). Hence, there also exists a
(0, εa , δ , single peak) – Arbitrary Outliers vs Random Profile
Tester with the same sample complexity for every 0 < εa < 1 and
0 < δ < 1/2 such that consingle peak((1 − εa )m) < 1.
Proof. We sample ℓ = min{(1− εa )m, 2 log1/εa 1/δ } alternatives
uniformly at random without replacement. Let B be the set of
sampled alternatives. We now sample t = 18 ln 2 log1/εa
1/δ
δ prefer-
ences uniformly at random with replacement restricted to B. Let
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Algorithm3 (0, εa , δ , single peak) –RandomOutliers vs Random
Profile Tester
Input: Oracle access to a profile P
Output: 1 if there exists εam alternatives whose deletion makes
the resulting profile single peaked and 0 ifP has been generated
randomly
1: Sample ℓ = min{(1− εa )m, 2 log1/εa 1/δ } alternatives uniformly
at random from A without replacement. Let B be the set of
sampled alternatives.
2: Sample t = 18 ln 2 log1/εa
1/δ
δ uniformly random preferences
restricted to B. Let the sampled profile be Q ∈ L(B)t
3: for Every distinct a,b, c ∈ B do
4: if at least one permutation in L({a,b, c}) is not present in
Q then
5: return 1
6: end if
7: end for
8: return 0
Q be the set of sampled preferences. We output 1 if there exist
3 alternatives a,b, c ∈ B such that at least one permutation in
L({a,b, c}) is not present in Q and output 0 otherwise. We ob-
serve that the sample complexity of our algorithm is O(tℓ log ℓ) =
O(log log1/εa 1/δδ log1/εa 1δ log log1/εa 1/δ ). We now turn to the cor-
rectness of our algorithm. For that we show that irrespective of the
input profile, the probability of making an error is at most δ .
▷Case I - the input profile is single peaked after deleting
at most εam alternatives: Let A be the set of alternatives and
W ⊂ A with |W| ⩽ εam such that the input profile restricted
to (A \W) is single peaked. Then we have the following for the
chosen value of ℓ:
Pr[error] ⩽ Pr[|B ∩W| ⩾ ℓ − 2]
= εℓa +
(
ℓ
1
)
(1 − εa )εℓ−1a +
(
ℓ
2
)
(1 − εa )2εℓ−2a
⩽ εℓa + ℓεℓ−1a + ℓ2εℓ−2a ⩽ δ
▷Case II - the input profile has been generated uniformly
at random: For any 3 alternatives a,b, c ∈ A, we define a random
variableX {a,b,c } to be 1 if all 6 possible permutations inL({a,b, c})
are present inQ({a,b, c}) and 0 otherwise. Using folklore tail bound
for the coupon collector problem (for example, see [33, Chap 3.6]),
we obtain the following for the chosen value of t .
Pr[X {a,b,c } = 0] ⩽ 6−t/3 ln 6 ⩽ e−t/6
Now using union bound, we obtain the following for the chosen
values of ℓ and t .
Pr[error] ⩽ Pr[∃{a,b, c} ⊂ B,X {a,b,c } = 0] ⩽
(
ℓ
3
)
e−
t
6 ⩽ δ □
From the proof of Theorem 3.10, Corollary 3.11 follows.
Corollary 3.11. For every domain D, there exists a (0, εa , δ , D)
– Arbitrary Outliers vs Random Profile Tester with sample
complexity O(log log1/εa 1/δδ log1/εa 1δ log log1/εa 1/δ ) for every 0 <
εa < 1 and 0 < δ < 1/2 such that conD ((1 − εa )m) < 1.
We show below that the condition conD ((1− εa )m) < 1 in Theo-
rem 3.10 and Corollary 3.11 is necessary. We prove Proposition 3.12
by carefully constructing a set of outliers such the the sample dis-
tribution in both the possibilities are statistically indistinguishable.
Proposition 3.12. For every domain D, there does not exist any
(0, εa , δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs Random Profile Tester if
conD ((1 − εa )m) = 1.
We now turn to the (0, 0, 0, ε ′a , δ , single peak) – Arbitrary Out-
liers vs Arbitrary Profile Test problem. The following results
show that the sample complexity of this problem is Ω(n log 1/δ )
even for the single peaked and single crossing domains.
Theorem 3.13. Any (0, 0, 0, ε ′a , δ , single peak) – Arbitrary
Outliers vs Arbitrary Profile Tester has sample complexity
Ω(n log 1/δ ) for every 0 < ε ′a ⩽ 1 and 0 < δ < 1/2 such that
consingle peak((1 − ε ′a )m) < 1.
Theorem 3.14. Any (0, 0, 0, ε ′a , δ , D) – Arbitrary Outliers vs
Arbitrary Profile Tester has sample complexity Ω(n log 1/δ ) for
single crossing domain for every 0 < ε ′a ⩽ 1 and 0 < δ < 1/2 such
that consingle crossing((1 − ε ′a )m) < 1.
4 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
The algorithms presented in Section 3 provide upper bounds on the
sample complexities of the problems of outlier detection. These al-
gorithms distinguish between two possibilities of profile generation
with a probability of correctness of at least (1 − δ ). It is interesting
to find out the optimal multiplying factors of the sampling com-
plexities inside O(·) in these algorithms. This is why an empirical
evaluation is called for.
In this section, we empirically find the factors for the results of
Theorems 3.1, 3.4 and 3.10, which provide constant time algorithms
for the testing problem. The other two cases as shown in Table 1
either consider an exponential time (Corollary 3.9) algorithm or
provide a lower bound (Theorem 3.13), which are unsuitable for an
empirical study.
4.1 Approach for Theorems 3.1 and 3.4:
We generate n = 10, 000 preferences withm alternatives uniformly
at random to form a preference profile. The sampling algorithm of
Theorem 3.1 (given by Algorithm 1) picks an ℓ for a given εv . In
this experiment, we choose a sampling size l that is smaller than
ℓ, and apply the same algorithm using l preferences sampled with
replacement from the population of n. We generate the preference
profile 100 times and for every profile, sample l preferences 100
times. We consider the fraction of correct classifications given by
this modified sampling algorithm and plot it with increasing l . We
fix δ = 0.001 for these evaluations. We show the plot of the fraction
of correct classification (denoted by ρ) for Theorem 3.1 withm = 3
in Figure 1. The plot shows the growth of the empirical probability
of correctness (and therefore does not need any errorbar). The
x-axis shows the normalized sample size (that is l/ℓ). Notice that
the growth of the curves almost overlaps for different εv s, and
reaches (1−δ ) nearly at 0.5. This empirically shows that when other
parameters are held fixed at the chosen values, the hidden constant
in the upper bound of the sample complexity in the context of
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Figure 1: Fraction of correct classification (ρ) of the adapta-
tion of Algorithm 1 when l(⩽ ℓ) preferences have been sam-
pled uniformly at random from a randompreference profile
of size n = 10, 000, δ = 0.001 (x-axis shows the normalized
value, l/ℓ).
random outliers can be reduced by almost 50%, and is independent
of εv .
We perform a similar exercise with different sampling sizes for
the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 3.4 (given by Algorithm 2)
with m = 5 in Figure 2. Here too, the proportionality factor is
independent of the εv s, and the hidden constant factor in this case
can be reduced by 60%.
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Figure 2: Fraction of correct classification (ρ) of the adapta-
tion of Algorithm 2 when l(⩽ ℓ) preferences have been sam-
pled uniformly at random from a randompreference profile
of size n = 10, 000, δ = 0.001 (x-axis shows the normalized
value, l/ℓ).
Why the error with a random/arbitrary outliers profile being
classified as a random profile is not considered? We argue that
such an error is not very likely in the algorithms of these theorems,
which is also manifested in our simulations. Therefore we omit
them presenting here. For Theorem 3.1, since the focus is only on
the three alternatives a,b, and c , the number of random outliers
will be close to εvn/6 for large enough n. If l preferences are drawn
uniformly at random with replacement from this profile, it is very
likely thatmini Xi will be at most close to εv l/6 for reasonably sized
l . The algorithm classifies the profile as random outlier profile if
mini Xi ⩽ l (1+εv )/12 and since εv l/6 ⩽ l (1+εv )/12, it is unlikely that
a random outlier profile will be classified as random profile under
this algorithm. Similar observation is true for Theorem 3.4.
4.2 Approach for Theorem 3.10:
Here we consider the alternatives as outliers. The algorithm in the
proof of this theorem (given by Algorithm 3) samples ℓ alternatives
uniformly at random and samples t preferences restricted to the
sampled alternatives uniformly at random. In this case, we pick the
values of δ and n as before. We fixm = 9, and pick ℓ = min{(1 −
εa )m, 2 log1/εa 1/δ } as given in the proof of Theorem 3.10, and vary
the value of τ (⩽ t), which is the sampling size of the preferences
restricted to the chosen ℓ alternatives. The alternatives of size ℓ
are sampled 100 times. Figure 3 shows the plot of the fraction of
correct classification (ρ) under this setting. It empirically shows
that when other parameters are held fixed at the chosen values, the
hidden constant of the upper bound of the probability in the case
of random alternative outliers can be reduced by almost 75%, and
is independent of εa .
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Figure 3: Fraction of correct classification (ρ) of the adapta-
tion of Algorithm 3 when τ (⩽ t) preferences have been sam-
pled uniformly at random from a randompreference profile
of size n = 10, 000with ℓ = min{(1− εa )m, 2 log1/εa 1/δ } as given
in the proof,m = 10,δ = 0.001 (x-axis shows the normalized
value, τ/t ).
In a way similar to the previous paragraph we can argue that this
algorithm also has a bias towards classifying a profile as random
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alternative outlier, which also is empirically manifested. Hence, we
omit presenting them here.
5 DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have developed sampling based algorithms for
testing if a profile is close to some specific domain. These testing
problem can be quite accurately solved by observing a small num-
ber of samples for most of the cases, and the numbers are often
independent to the number of preferences or alternatives. In other
cases, we have proved impossibility results. Our extensive empirical
study further improve the constants of the asymptotic theoretical
upper bounds on the sample complexity by 50% to 75% depending
on the problem. As a future work, there exist more sophisticated
notion of distances, namely swap distance, footrule distance, max-
imum displacement distance, etc. where it will be interesting to
extend our results to those fine grained measures of distance.
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